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The transition environment of 11 EU member countries has created an exceptional
opportunity for research on the inﬂuence of legal central bank independence (LCBI)
on inﬂation within signiﬁcantly different circumstances in comparison to developed
Western countries. I construct my own transformed GMT (TGMT) model for estima-
tion of the LCBI, researching transition in its early stages and later on, thus compris-
ing the total period of transition. Even in early stages of the transition LCBI has
signiﬁcantly negative effects on inﬂation. In later phases all the countries show evi-
dently high levels of the LCBI and low inﬂation rates, but in this phase increasing
the LCBI would not result in decreasing the inﬂation rate. Only studying the entire
period of the transition would show that LCBI has signiﬁcant negative inﬂuence on
inﬂation, clearly showing different levels of the LCBI and inﬂation, which was not
so obvious in shorter intervals. Moreover, negative inﬂuence of the LCBI on inﬂation
does not change even if I add budget deﬁcit as an independent variable to my
research.
Keywords: central bank independence (CBI); transformed GMT (TGMT) index; in-
ﬂation; transition countries; budget deﬁcit
JEL classiﬁcation: E52, E58.
1. Introduction
The dilemma of choosing between the government and the central bank as the authority
for conducting monetary policy was, after a long time, resolved in favour of the latter.
The era of high inﬂation rates during the 1970s has inﬂuenced a very successful institu-
tionally designed conduct of monetary policy. Therefore, the last few decades brought
strong ideas and theoretical attitudes of central bank independence (CBI) and its role in
maintaining monetary stability. Experiences acquired inspired reaching of broader con-
sensus of politicians and economists accepting the neutral position of monetary policy
in the long-run regarding achievement of certain macroeconomic goals.
The historical phenomenon of the transition of planned-administrative economies
into modern market economies created unique opportunities for research on the inﬂu-
ence of CBI on inﬂation in quite different circumstances of those in developed Western
countries. I believe that 11 observed countries are suitable for such research due to the
similarity of the transition path, EU membership, etc. Using such an opportunity, I
created my own model for evaluating the legal central bank independence (LCBI) in
order to explore its inﬂuence on inﬂation in early and later stages of transition, namely
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establishing that it has a negative effect on inﬂation, taking into consideration the whole
period of transition.
2. Theoretical attitudes on the CBI and an outline of the empiric research
Contemporary ideas of the CBI exist since Tinbergen’s (1954) research. He proved that
if there were few economic goals in conﬂict, each of the economic goals had to be
solved by an independent specialised institution. Nevertheless, the most important rea-
son for establishing a central bank with a high level of independency is a time-inconsis-
tency problem of the monetary policy. According to Kydland and Prescott (1977), the
creators of the economic policy shall, by accepting the rules of the game, disable inﬂa-
tionary surprises, and so make their policy credible to the economic participants. Lucas
and Sargent (1981) have given a serious warning to creators of economic policy that
behaviour of the economic participants could be signiﬁcantly changed if the concept of
the policy relied too much on the previous patterns, while Rogoff (1985) has shown that
time-inconsistency problems of monetary policy could be avoided by delegating author-
ity for its conduct to the conservative central banker.
Neumann (1991) has established speciﬁc elements for achieving CBI, such as prohi-
bition of granting loans to the public sector, independence of governmental instructions,
prohibition to support governmental economic programmes, etc. The author suggests that
CBI should be given a clear constitutional category and introduces the idea of central
bank responsibility. Bade and Parkin (1988) used a four grade index for measuring the
CBI. Some other authors consider CBI to be the best ﬁrst step in achieving low inﬂation
rates, based on the work of Grilli, Masciandaro, and Tabellini (1991), Cukierman (1992),
Alesina and Summers (1993), Eijfﬁnger and Schaling (1993), Briault, Haldane, and King
(1996), among others. The previously mentioned authors provide various models for
measuring levels of CBI and for establishing the correlation between CBI and inﬂation in
some Western countries. Thus, Grilli et al. (1991) developed a more complex index of
the CBI, comprising the sub-index of the political independency of eight indicators, and
the sub-index of the economic independency of seven indicators.
Debelle and Fischer (1995) recognised two types of CBI: intended independency
and instrumental independency. De Haan and Kooi (2000) decomposed indicators made
by Cukierman (1992) and Grilli et al. (1991) turning them into indicators of the con-
servative tendencies of the central bank incorporated into a legal frame. Banaian, Bur-
dekin, and Willett (1998) also observed components of Cukierman’s index and
concluded that one part of the index components has no signiﬁcant relationship to inﬂa-
tion movements. Moser (1999) explored the inﬂuence of the parliamentary representa-
tives to the credibility of the central bank. Keefer and Stasavage (1999) were proving
that indicators of the LCBI in developing countries were not in correlation with inﬂa-
tion, and that correlation is possible only under appropriate surveillance and balance.
Furthermore, Hayo (1998) in his work was proving that CBI could be in correlation
with public opinion and its inclination to inﬂation. Hayo and Hefeker (2002) used his-
toric data showing that the CBI is not a necessary source for price stability in many
countries. Forder (1988) proves that upon correction of certain subjective inclinations,
negative correlation between CBI and inﬂation could even disappear. Mangano (1998)
came to the similar conclusion, while Posen (1998) and Jordan (1997) explain that a
higher grade of CBI is connected to the periods of higher expenses of disinﬂation. The
central bank and the government can be involved in a ‘game of chicken’, speciﬁcally
explained in the works of Buiter (1999) and Kutsoati (2002). Walsh (1999) points out
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that CBI is a long-term guarantee that might set monetary policy free of the political
pressure, but also poses the questions of its transparency. Arnone, Laurens, and Sega-
lotto (2006) have researched CBI in OECD countries, emerging markets and developing
countries based on the methodologies developed by Grilli et al. (1991) and the
methodology used by Cukierman (1992). Their research for the 18 OECD countries is
analysed in the index by Grilli, Masciandaro, and Tabellini; (GMT; full index) and they
also converted the Cukierman data into the GMT index for the remaining 50 countries
(narrow index). Arnone et al. underline the signiﬁcant rise in CBI in recent decades.
Imperato (2002) has shown that greater grades of CBI can lead to moral hazards
towards the part of the public, encouraging again the process of inﬂation.
One of the most complete pieces of research about CBI and its inﬂuence to some
macro-economic aggregates in transition countries was conducted by Cukierman, Miller,
and Neyapti (2002). The authors used two measurements of CBI, and have found out
that the most important inﬂuence on the level of CBI in transition countries has: alloca-
tion of the authorities in conducting monetary policy, procedure of resolving the conﬂict
between the government and the central bank, and recognises the importance of the
price stability in central bank legislation. Maliszewski (2000) used GMT index compris-
ing 20 countries in his research. He found that political CBI has been in stronger nega-
tive correlation to inﬂation than the economic independency itself. Radzyner and
Riesinger (1997) were researching central bank legislation of the Middle European
transition countries and established that they have relatively high levels of legal
independency, even if they used the provisions of the Maastricht Treaty as a criterion.
By researching actual CBI, the authors concluded that some of the countries were still
not free from the political interference. Lybek (1999) used as a measurement an index
which constituted 21 indicators, including the elements of measuring central banks’
responsibility. The author has established that countries with higher levels of de jure
independence and the responsibility of the respective central banks have lower inﬂation
rates in the period 1995–1997. Dvorsky (2004) was researching legislation from Middle
East Europe and concluded that the central banks were not free from political
interference in practice.
The main imperfections of the conducted research lie in the fact that they have not
taken into consideration that the process of transition is not consistent in terms of time
in relevant countries and it has different dynamic, therefore it should be divided into
separate entities that all have their own speciﬁc qualities. In some countries it could take
less time and still be more effective, while in other countries it could last longer and be
less effective. In some countries transition is reaching its end, however some transition
countries may still be far from that. Therefore remarks may be made in respect to the
observed countries, because they should be divided into separate groups regarding their
level of economic development, geographic position, and historical circumstances at the
time.
3. Creating the TGMT model for measuring the LCBI
In this work I shall compose a transformed GMT model (TGMT), based on the model
created by Grilli et al. and ideas from Neuman’s theoretical considerations. In the part
of the GMT model related to the procedure of the appointment and relieving of the
central bank governor and board it is stated that they must not be appointed by the
government. I consider that the president of the country should not participate in
the appointment, since some part of the administration is under his jurisdiction.
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Furthermore, Neuman has outlined that the mandate of the governor should exceed the
election period (four years). This one year of mandate, requested by the GMT method,
should not make us give negative grades to CBI, in case the mandate of the governor
and the board lasted slightly less than ﬁve years and yet longer than the election period
of the country.
I will also introduce indicators requesting that reasons of relieving the governor and
the board members should not be politically motivated and two indicators related to per-
sonal independence of the governor and board members, who all should comprise high
professional and moral competence (Neumann). The GMT model shall also be updated
by indicators showing that central bank does not have to support the government’s eco-
nomic policy, its active role in budget creating, bank responsibility to the parliament,
and transparency of its work. Consequently, indicators of the political independency
would be as follows (with differences from GMT and the Cukierman index as the basis
of the index constructed by Arnone et al.):
(1) The governor is not appointed by government or the president (without president
in GMT, executive and legislative branch in Cukierman)
(2) The governor is appointed for longer than four years (ﬁve in GMT, more in
Cukierman)
(3) Not all the board is appointed by government or the president (without president
in GMT, no provisions in Cukierman)
(4) The board is appointed for longer than four years (ﬁve in GMT, no provisions
in Cukierman)
(5) The termination of the mandate of the governor and the board are not political
(no provisions in GMT, provisions for governor and not for a board in
Cukierman)
(6) The governor and the board members have high professional and moral compe-
tence (no provisions in GMT, no provisions in Cukierman)
(7) Financial circumstances in the central bank are better in comparison to other
ﬁnancial institutions (no provisions in GMT, no provisions in Cukierman)
(8) No mandatory representatives of the government on the board (same in GMT,
only provisions for governor in Cukierman)
(9) The government’s approval of the monetary policy is not mandatory (same in
GMT, similar in Cukierman)
(10) The central bank does not support government economic policy (no provisions
in GMT, no provisions in Cukierman)
(11) The central bank is actively involved in creating the budget (no provisions in
GMT, no provisions in Cukierman)
(12) The central bank claims maintaining the monetary stability is a primary goal
(same in GMT, similar in Cukierman)
(13) Legal provisions give strength to the central bank in case of dispute with the
government (same in GMT, similar in Cukierman)
(14) The central bank is responsible to the parliament (no provisions in GMT, no
provisions in Cukierman)
(15) The central bank is obliged to regularly report on its activities (no provisions
in GMT, no provisions in Cukierman)
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The ﬁrst ﬁve indicators of the independence of the GMT index related to the mone-
tary ﬁnance of the public debt would remain unchanged. However, a new indicator
should be introduced, related to CBI in the conducting of the exchange rate policy. The
authority of the central bank to deﬁne interest rates would be extended to the authority
to dispose with the instruments of the monetary policy. Regarding the last indicator that
requested surveillance of the central bank to be given to an authorised special agency,
there are conﬂict opinions on the matter, so I excluded this request from TGMT model.
Consequently, transformed measure of the economic CBI would be as follows:
(1) Direct credit facility is not automatic (same in GMT, similar in Cukierman)
(2) Direct credit facility is at a market interest rate (same in GMT, similar in
Cukierman)
(3) Direct credit facility is temporary (same in GMT, similar in Cukierman)
(4) Direct credit facility is at limited amount (same in GMT, similar in Cukierman)
(5) The central bank doesn’t participate in primary market for public debt (same in
GMT, same in Cukierman)
(6) The central bank has a full sovereignty in conducting the exchange rate policy
(same in GMT, no provisions in Cukierman)
(7) The central bank disposes of relevant instruments of the monetary policy (no
provisions in GMT, no provisions in Cukierman)
4. The application of the TGMT model in research of the inﬂuence of the CBI on
the inﬂation in the early period of the transition
In the early period of the transition in the observed countries, there are essential differ-
ences in the ways of choice of the central bank governor and council members, as well
as duration of their mandates. Thus, in Estonia the governor of the central bank is
appointed by the president on the basis of the suggestion of the chairman of the board,
while members of the board are appointed by the parliament on the basis of the presi-
dent’s motion, all for a term of ﬁve years. In Latvia, the choice of the governor and the
board is in the parliament’s jurisdiction for a term of six years. Lithuanian president pro-
poses the governor for a ﬁve year term of service while the board is elected for a term
of nine years, by the president himself on the governor’s proposal. Polish president pro-
poses appointment of the governor for a six years term of service, while the board is
elected by him personally, for a period longer than four years. The Czech president is
directly involved in the choice of the governor and seven members of the board for a
period of six years. Slovakian parliament proposes the governor, the vice-governor and
executive directors who are appointed by the president for a period of six years, while
the board is appointed by the president, based on the proposal of the government upon
the approval of the parliament, for a period of four years. The Romanian president pro-
poses the governor, while the prime minister proposes the board members for a period
of eight years. Hungarian government proposes the governor for appointment for a
period of six years, while the board is appointed by the president on the government’s
proposal and the prime minister’s approval. The board has up to 11 members, and vice-
governors are elected for a six year period, while the rest of the board members are
elected for a period of three years. The Slovenian president proposes the appointment of
the governor for a period of six years, while the parliament elects the governor’s deputy
and three vice-governors, based on the president’s proposal and six members of the
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board for a period of six years. The Croatian governor and the board members are
appointed by parliament for a period of six years, while the governor proposes his dep-
uty and vice-governors.
Most of the transition countries have agreed that the reason for early termination of
the governors’ or board members’ mandate should be of a non-political nature, such as
article 12 of Estonian law, or in accordance with article 58 of Hungarian law and the like,
but there are no such provisions in Slovenian, Romanian and Croatian laws. In Latvian,
Lithuanian, Polish, and other countries’ legislations there are no provisions that would
deﬁne personal independence of the governor and the board. The Estonian ﬁnance minis-
ter is a member of the board, while the Latvian ﬁnance minister attends meetings of the
board with suspended decision-making authority. Furthermore, Polish, Czech, Slovakian
and Hungarian ﬁnance ministers also attend the board meetings. In Estonia there is a cer-
tain advisory relationship of the central bank and the government and it is stated in arti-
cle 4, that the central bank should support the government’s economic policy. There is a
similar relationship between the Latvian central bank and its government, while in
Lithuania and Romania governmental approval of the monetary policy is mandatory.
The National Bank of Poland is obliged to cooperate with the government in the
conducting of monetary policy and it has an advisory position. Also, in the Czech
Republic the relationship between the central bank and the government is of advisory
nature, while in Hungary the relationship between the central bank and the government
is regulated as collaboration in conducting the monetary policy. The central bank should
support governmental economic policy in Estonia (article 4 of the law), Hungary and
Poland (article 3), and also in Slovakia, Croatia, Bulgaria, etc. Only the central banks of
Estonia, Poland and Hungary participate in the creating of the budget. The monetary
stability is a primary goal of the monetary policy in all the observed transition countries.
Some countries haven’t in the legislative provisions strengthening the position of the
central bank in case of the dispute with the government like Lithuania, Poland, Hun-
gary, etc., but in Latvia, the ﬁnance minister is authorised to withhold the decision of
the board for up to 10 days. The central banks of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Hun-
gary are responsible to the parliament for their work. Also, the central banks of Estonia,
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, etc. regularly report their activities to the public.
In the early period of the transition, Estonian legislation prohibits direct granting of
loans to the government, while in Latvia there is a quantity limitation of the governmen-
tal crediting in the amount of 1/12 of planned budget funds, but without applying the
market interest rate. Czech and Slovakian central banks can directly grant loans to the
government for a period up to three months in a limited quantity of 5% of the previous
year’s budget. The Hungarian central bank can grant the government direct loan privi-
leges at a basic interest rate for a period of 15 days, while the debt must be covered
before the end of the budget year. The Slovenian central bank can directly grant loans
to the government at the market interest rate and up to 5% of the budget or 20% of the
budget deﬁcit and the debt must be covered by the end of the budget year. The Roma-
nian central bank can directly grant loans to the government at the market interest rate
without time limitations, but only up to 10% of the amount of the budget value, i.e. up
to two times the capital and reserves of the central bank. The Croatian National Bank
can grant short-term loans to the government at an interest rate lower than the market
rate, the term of payment is by the end of the budget year and up to 5% of the budget.
Furthermore, the Estonian central bank does not participate in the direct granting of
loans to the government, while central banks of Lithuania, Poland and Czech Republic
can do so. Polish legislation states in article 24 that the National Bank of Poland
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collaborate with the Cabinet, bringing together the decisions of conducting the exchange
rate policy. Also, Hungarian legislation states that the exchange rate should be deﬁned
by the government in collaboration with the central bank. The central banks of Estonia,
Latvia, the Czech Republic, Slovenia and some other countries have full sovereignty in
conducting the exchange rate policy and disposing monetary policy instruments.
CBI of the transition countries, showed by TGMT indicators, will be related to the
inﬂation, expressed by the indicator of the depreciation of the real value of money π/1+π;
where π represents the measurement of the inﬂation. I note that indicator of the deprecia-
tion of the real value of money has also been introduced in Cukierman (1992), Cukierman
et al. (2002), among others. I observe inﬂation during the period 1994–2002, which is
marked by a series of economic reforms, not taking into account the highest and lowest
rates in order to preserve the stability of the series. Furthermore, it is obvious that the value
of the cumulative liberalisation index after 1994 in all of the observed countries was higher
than two. Cumulative liberalization index (CLI) has been used in Cukierman et al. (2002),
and Loungani and Sheets (1997) etc. too. See Tables 1–10 and Figures 1–3.
In my research I used the TGMT model, which resulted in a clearer stochastic con-
nection expressed as a negative linear correlation between LCBI of the observed transi-
tion countries and the inﬂation (r = −0.41). With higher LCBI, the equation of the
regression line obviously shows declining of the inﬂation indicators (Y = 13.6047–
10.5047x). As I have already stated, even in early stages of the transition, the observed
countries have a different degree of the CBI, in which process the countries with a
higher degree of bank independence have a somewhat lower inﬂation rate. However, the
research has been done in a period when dramatic economic changes occurred, with a
limited range and number of the observed elements, therefore it demands studying of
the inﬂuence of the CBI to the inﬂation in the whole period of transition. On top of this,
some of the countries in the early stages of transition fall behind others in the realisation
of economic reforms, which confuses the homogeneity within the observed set. Thus it
is obvious that even the slightest deviation can produce a somewhat different result.
5. Application of the TGMT model in the research on the inﬂuence of the LCBI
on inﬂation in the later period of the transition
In the later period of transition Estonian legislation states that the president appoints the
governor based on the supervisory board’s proposition, for a period of seven years,
while the choice of the remaining members is made by the supervisory board of the
central bank at the governor’s proposition. The Latvian parliament (Saeima) appoints
the governor on the basis of the proposition of at least 10 members of the parliament,
while the board is appointed by the top executive council at the governor’s proposition,
all for a period of six years. The Lithuanian governor is still appointed by the
parliament (Seim) at the president’s proposal for a ﬁve year mandate. Mandate of the
board still lasts for nine years. The nine Polish members of the board, now in equal pro-
portions, are appointed by the president, the parliament (Sejm) and the senate for a per-
iod of six years. The Czech president appoints the governor and the board for a period
of six years. The Slovakian governor is still appointed by the president at the govern-
ment’s proposal and with the recommendation of the Slovakian National Council, but
now for a period of ﬁve years. The Slovenian president proposes the governor, the
vice-governors and the board, who are appointed by the National Council for a period
of six years. The Bulgarian governor is appointed by the National Council for a period
of six years. The governor’s deputy is also appointed by the National Council at the




































































































































































































































































































































governor’s proposal, while the board is appointed by the president for a period of six
years. The Romanian parliament appoints the governor and board for a period of ﬁve
years. The Croatian governor, as well as the external members of the council, is
appointed by the parliament at the proposal of the Committee for Election, Appoint-
ments and Administrative Procedures with the advice of the ﬁnance and budget council.
While the deputy and the vice-governors are appointed by the parliament at the gover-
nor’s proposal. In the meantime Estonia, Slovakia and Slovenia have transferred their
monetary sovereignty to the European Central Bank (ECB), but there is still a certain
role of their respective central banks with the European System of Central Banks
(ESCB) ‘within the scope of their activity’.
Table 3. CBI, inﬂation, and CLI in the early period of transition (1994–2002).
Countries TGMT Inﬂation (average 1994–2002) p1þp CLI (1994)
Estonia 17 12.1 0.11 2.93
Latvia 15 9.0 0.08 2.45
Lithuania 10 11.6 0.10 2.72
Poland 9 13.9 0.12 4.14
Czech R. 12 6.7 0.06 3.64
Slovakia 11 8.3 0.08 3.47
Hungary 11 14.9 0.13 4.11
Slovenia 13 9.2 0.08 4.16
Bulgaria 13 46.7 0.32 2.90
Romania 8 58.6 0.37 2.29
Croatia 15 3.8 0.04 3.98
Source: WEO, National legislation, Cukierman et al. (2002), author’s calculation.
Table 4. CBI and the inﬂation in the early period of transition (1994–2002).
Dependent-inﬂation R = 0,41009355 F = 1,819606
R2 = 0,16817672 df = 1,9 std. error of estimate: 0,103218505
No. of cases: 11 Adjusted r2 = 0,07575191 p = 0,210318
intercept: 0,330480769 Std.error: 0,1478903 t(9) = 2,2346
beta (CBI) = −0,41 p = 0,0523
Source: Author’s calculation.
Table 2. Economic CBI in the early period of transition (1994–2002).
Countries (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Estonia * * * * * * * 7
Latvia * − − * − * * 4
Lithuania − − − * − * * 3
Poland * − − * − − * 3
Czech R. * − * * − * * 5
Slovakia * − * * − * * 5
Hungary * * * * − − * 5
Slovenia * − * * − * * 5
Bulgaria * − * * * − * 5
Romania * − − * − − * 3
Croatia * − * * − * * 5
Source: National legislation, author’s calculation.


































































































































































































































































































































Table 6. Economic CBI in later periods of transition (2003–2012).
Countries (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Estonia * * * * * * * 7
Latvia * * * * * * * 7
Lithuania * * * * * * * 7
Poland * * * * * * * 7
Czech R. * * * * * − * 6
Slovakia * * * * * * * 7
Hungary * * * * * − * 6
Slovenia * * * * * * * 7
Bulgaria * * * * * − * 6
Romania * * * * * * * 7
Croatia * * * * * * * 7
Source: National legislation, author’s calculation.
Table 7. CBI and inﬂation in later periods of transition (2003–2012).
Countries TGMT Inﬂation (average 2003–2012) p1þp
Estonia 19 3.8 0.04
Latvia 20 5.0 0.05
Lithuania 18 3.4 0.03
Poland 18 2.7 0.03
Czech R. 16 2.3 0.02
Slovakia 18 3.7 0.04
Hungary 18 4.9 0.05
Slovenia 17 3.2 0.03
Bulgaria 18 4.6 0.04
Romania 19 7.2 0.07
Croatia 19 2.7 0.03
Source: WEO, National legislation, author’s calculation.
Table 8. CBI and inﬂation in the later period of transition (2003–2012).
Dependent- inﬂation R = 0.61899155 F = 5.590270
R2 = 0,38315054 df = 1,9 Std. error of estimate: 0.011384230
No. of cases: 11 Adjusted R2 = 0.31461171 p = 0.042297
Intercept: −0.104375 Std. Error: 0.0607752 t(9) = −1.717
Beta (CBI) = 0.619 p = 0.12
Source: Author’s calculation.
Table 9. CBI and inﬂation in the entire period of transition (1994–2012).
Dependent-inﬂation R = 0.62056398 F = 12.5256
R2 = 0.38509966 df = 1.2 Std. error of estimate: 0.071919607
No. of cases: 22 Adjusted R2 = 0.35435464 p = 0.00206
Intercept: 0.316064372 Std. Error: 0.0664395 t(20) = 4.7572
Beta (CBI) = −0.62 p = 0.0001
Source: Author’s calculation.
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Non-political reasons for termination of the mandate of governor and board, as well
as the provisions deﬁning their high professional expertise and moral qualities are
incorporated in the legislations of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and the Czech
Republic. In these countries there are no mandatory representatives of the government
within the board, nor the governmental obligation to approve the monetary policy. How-
ever the central bank does not support economic policy of the government in Latvia
and Slovakia, and participates in creation of the budget only in Estonia, Poland and






















Figure 1. Central bank independence and inﬂation in the early period of transition (1994–2002).
Source: WEO, National legislation, author’s calculation.



























Figure 2. Central bank independence and inﬂation in the later period of transition (2003–2012).
Source: WEO, National legislation, author’s calculation.
Table 10. CBI, budget deﬁcit and inﬂation in the whole period of transition (1994–2012).
Dependent-inﬂation Multiple R= 0.66614646 F = 7.578686
R2 = 0.44375111 df = 2,19 Std. error of estimate: 0.070180703
No. of cases: 22 Adjusted R2 = 0,38,519,860 p = 0.003802
Intercept: 0.369690079 Std.error: 0.0750917 t(19) = 4,9232
Beta (CBI) = −0.70 Beta (BD) = 0.254 p = 0.0001
Source: Author’s calculation.
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Hungary. Monetary stability is the primary goal of the monetary policy in all of the
observed countries. Nowadays, the position of all the central banks is strengthened in
possible disputes with the government, and banks regularly publish information on their
activities on their respective web pages, issuing bulletins, etc.
Let me now analyse the economic side of the TGMT Model. In Estonia, the direct
credit facility of the government is completely prohibited, and is now applied to all the
institutions and agencies of the EU and the member countries. There are no changes
regarding the ﬁfth and sixth indicators, while the last one is also positive, since the bank
disposes with the instruments of the monetary policy. The Bank of Latvia is prohibited
from granting loans to the government and participating at the primary market for
covering the public debt. The bank also establishes the exchange rate and disposes with
the adequate instruments of the monetary policy.
The Lithuanian central bank is prohibited from granting loans to the government
bodies and institutions of the EU, etc., while the government and the bank must not
trade securities on the primary market. The bank has a full sovereignty in conducting
the exchange rate policy and the instruments of the monetary policy. The National Bank
of Poland does not grant loan privileges to the government anymore, nor does it partici-
pate in the primary market for covering the public debt. The bank establishes the
exchange rate and disposes with instruments of monetary policy. The Czech central
bank is prohibited from granting loans to the government, or trading securities on the
primary market for covering the public debt. The bank collaborates with the government
in conducting the exchange rate policy (article 35), but still disposes with adequate
instruments of the monetary policy. Slovakia prohibits any direct privileged loans to the
government bodies and institutions of the EU and the bank does not participate in the
primary market for covering the public debt. The bank establishes the exchange rate
and disposes with instruments of the monetary policy.
The Hungarian central bank is prohibited from granting loans to central, regional or
local administration bodies and institutions of the EU and from directly buying govern-
mental securities. The bank must collaborate with the government in conducting the
exchange rate policy (article 11), while disposing with instruments of the monetary policy.
The National Bank of Slovenia is also prohibited from granting direct loans to the govern-

























Y  = 17,412 - 25,55 X
Figure 3. Central bank independence and inﬂation in the entire period of transition (1994–2012).
Source: WEO, National legislation, author’s calculation.
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ment, etc. The bank does not participate on the primary market for covering the public
debt; it has sovereignty in establishing the exchange rate and disposes the instruments of
the monetary policy. The Bulgarian central bank is not permitted to grant loans to the gov-
ernment, while the bank and the government must not trade between themselves in the pri-
mary market for covering the public debt. The Bulgarian situation was speciﬁc due to the
introduction of the typical currency-board (article 30). The National Bank of Romania is
prohibited from granting direct credit facilities to the government and it could not partici-
pate in the primary market for covering the public debt. The bank still disposes with instru-
ments of the monetary policy and conducts the exchange rate policy. The Croatian
National Bank shows all positive indicators of the economic independence.
In the later period of transition (2003–2012) the TGMT Model has showed very
high LCBI of the observed countries, which is in accordance to the low level of the
inﬂation, not taking into account its lowest and highest rate to preserve the stability of
the series. But, if I relate the LCBI to the inﬂation, expressed by the indicator of the
depreciation of the real value of money π/1 + π, I come to a very interesting result.
Namely the TGMT Model showed completely different relationship of the LCBI and
the inﬂation in the later phase of transition, but it does not change the conﬁrmation of
my hypothesis that transition countries have a high level of the LCBI and a low inﬂa-
tion rate. Thus, in this case the linear regression equation is even positive (Y =
48.5577X + 16.2837), just like the coefﬁcient of the correlation which is also very high
(r = 0.619). At ﬁrst it could be said that the CBI signiﬁcantly inﬂuences the growth of
the inﬂation, but this is, of course, wrong. The reason for such a relationship lies in the
fact that once I have obtained a high level of the CBI and a low inﬂation rate, it is not
possible to observe the ‘ﬁne nuances’ of their correlation in the same, above described
way, nor it is possible to precisely express the LCBI by TGMT Model (or any other
models). Of course, when observing the whole period of the transition, I see that the
relationship of the TGMT Model and inﬂation is completely different, which is logical
considering the application of the model on the longer period and with clearly expressed
levels of the CBI and of inﬂation, that is less obvious in short-term intervals.
6. Application of the TGMT model in research of the inﬂuence of the LCBI on
the inﬂation for the whole period of transition
The CBI of the transition countries, expressed in the TGMT Model, will be once more
put into relation to the inﬂation, expressed by the indicator of the depreciation of the
real value of money π/1 + π, but now for the whole period of the transition since 1994–
2012, by uniting early and later periods of transition.
The linear regression equation (Y = −25.55 + 17.412) clearly depicts decreasing of
the inﬂation values with increasing of the TGMT values. Only by taking into considera-
tion the whole period of the transition and with more cases observed, with clearly
deﬁned different levels of lower and higher CBI, it was possible to determine negative
inﬂuence of the LCBI to the inﬂation (r = − 0.62). Moreover, the TGMT Model is
shown as a very convenient model for measuring of CBI and proving of my basic start-
ing hypothesis. Furthermore, the completed TGMT Model shows clearly that the legal
provisions of the CBI are a signiﬁcant factor securing monetary stability of the transi-
tion countries as a premise of conducting a ‘healthy’ macro-economic policy. Therefore,
logically it is necessary to remove all possible political pressures aiming to diminish the
LCBI of the observed countries, because the monetary stability is set out to be the pri-
mary goal of their monetary policies.
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Since the prohibition of ﬁnancing the government by the central banks is a very
important component of the thesis, the statement that TGMT has a negative inﬂuence
on inﬂation shall be additionally supported by including the variable of the budget deﬁ-
cit (surplus) in correlation to the GDP, as a possible inﬂuence on inﬂation. The results
of multiple regression from Table 10 will clearly show that the budget deﬁcit has no
signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the inﬂation of the transition countries (r = −0.254), while the
inﬂuence of TGMT on inﬂation remains signiﬁcant and negative (–0.7). The correlation
between TGMT and the budget deﬁcit is also weak (r = 0.299). Thus I have additionally
supported my starting hypothesis that LCBI negatively inﬂuences the inﬂation of the
EU transition member countries.
7. Conclusion
The economic theories that support the strengthening of the CBI are based on research-
ing the time-inconsistency problem of the monetary policy, conducted ﬁrstly in devel-
oped market economies and later applied in practice and resulting in institutional
solutions and the decreasing of inﬂation rates. In my research, I explored whether the
strengthening of CBI had negative inﬂuence on the inﬂation in 11 transition countries –
members of the EU – concerning the fact that the conditions of the transition are signiﬁ-
cantly different to those in developed free market economies. I measured the CBI by
the TGMT index, and already in the early period of the transition I can conﬁrm the
results of Grilli et al. Cukierman et al. Arnone et al. etc. that CBI has a negative inﬂu-
ence on inﬂation. In the later period of the transition, I established a very high LCBI
and a low inﬂation rate in the observed countries, but I did not conﬁrm the results of
mentioned authors because the strengthening of CBI on this level does not have a nega-
tive inﬂuence to the inﬂation. When there is a high degree of CBI and low inﬂation, the
further increasing of CBI does not affect the reduction of inﬂation in transition coun-
tries, EU members. Only by considering the whole period of the transition can a signiﬁ-
cant negative inﬂuence of the LCBI to the inﬂation be clearly noted, even if I include
budget deﬁcit as an additional variable into the research. Therefore it is necessary to dis-
able political pressure to the central bank aimed to diminish the LCBI if price stability
is the primary goal of the respective countries’ monetary policies.
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Act on the Czech National Bank No. 6/1993, as amended by Act No. 60/1993., Act No. 15/
1998., Act No. 442/2000., Act No. 482/2001., Act No. 127/2002., Act No. 257/2004., Act
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issues 12.15.2011Law on the Bulgarian National Bank
Law on the Bulgarian National Bank, published in the Darjaven Vestnik, issue 46 of 10 June
1997; amended, issues 49 and 153 of 1998; issues 20 and 54 of 1999; issue 109 of 2001;
issue 45 of 2002; issues 10 and 39 of 2005; issues 37 and 59 of 2006: in force on the date of
entry into force of the Treaty of Accession of the Republic of Bulgaria to the European
Union; issue 108 of 2006; issues 52 and 59 of 2007; amended, issues 24, 42 and 44 of 2009;
amended; issues 97 and 101 of 2010
Law on the Central Bank of the Republic of Estonia, passed on May 18, 1993, April 05, 1994,
June 18, 1998, January 26, 1999, June 06, 2001, June 13, 2001, June 12, 2002, January 22,
2003, January 29, 2003, June 07, 2006, January 25, 2007, Mart 12, 2008, April 22, 2010,
October 28, 2010, December 15, 2011
Law on the Statute of the National Bank of Romania No. 34/1991, Law No. 101/1998, Law No.
312/2004
Treaty on European Union. (1992).
References
Alesina, A., & Summers, L. (1993). CBI and macroeconomic performance: Some comparative
evidence. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 25, 151–162. doi:10.2307/2077833
Arnone, M., Laurens B. J., & Segalotto, J. F. (2006). Measures of Central Bank autonomy:
Empirical evidence for OECD and developing countries, and emerging market economies
(Working Paper 06/228). Washington, DC: IMF.
Bade, R., & Parkin, M. (1988). Central bank laws and monetary policy (Working Paper). London,
ON: Department of Economics, University of Western Ontario.
Banaian, K., Burdekin, R. C. K., & Willett, T. D. (1998). Reconsidering the principal components
of CBI: The more the merrier? Public Choice, 97, 1–12.
Briault, C., Haldane, A., & King, M. (1996). Independence and accountability (Working Paper
No. 49). London: Bank of England.
Buiter, W. H. (1999). Monetary misconceptions: New and old paradigmata and other sad tales
(Working Paper No. 2365). London: CEPR.
Cukierman, A. (1992). Central bank strategy, credibility and independence: Theory and evidence.
Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Cukierman, A., Miller, G. P., & Neyapti, B. (2002). Central bank reform, liberalization and inﬂa-
tion in transition economies: An international perspective. Journal of Monetary Economics,
49, 237–264. doi:10.1016/S0304-3932(01)00107-6
Debelle, G., & Fischer, S. (1995). How independent should a central bank be? In J. C. Fuhrer
(Ed.), Goals, guidelines and constraints facing monetary policymakers (pp. 195–221). Boston,
MA: Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, Conference Series No. 38.
De Haan, J., & Kooi, W. J. (2000). Does CBI really matter? New evidence for developing coun-
tries using a new indicator. Journal of Banking & Finance, 24, 663–664. doi:10.1016/S0378-
4266(99)00084-9.
Dvorsky, S. (2004). CBI in southeastern Europe with a view to future EU accession. In Focus on
European Economic Integration 2/04 (pp. 50–75). BOFIT (Discussion Paper). Vienna:
Oesterreichische Nationalbank.
182 D. Piplica
Eijfﬁnger, S. C. W., & Schaling, E. (1993). Central bank independence: Theory and evidence
(Discussion Paper 9325). Center for Economic Research, Tilburg University.
Forder, J. (1988). The case for an independent European Central Bank: A reassessment of evi-
dence and sources. European Journal of Political Economy, 14, 53–71. doi:10.1016/S0176-
2680(97)00047-5
Grilli, V., Masciandaro, D., & Tabellini, G. (1991). Political and monetary institutions and public
ﬁnancial policies in the industrial countries. Economic Policy, 13, 341–392. doi:10.2307/
1344630
Hayo, B. (1998). Inﬂation culture, CBI and price stability. European Journal of Political Econ-
omy, 14, 241–263. doi:10.1016/S0176-2680(98)00006-8
Hayo, B., & Hefeker, C. (2002). Reconsidering CBI. European Journal of Political Economy, 18,
653–674. doi:10.1016/S0176-2680(02)00113-1.
Imperato, I. (2002). A case for transparency in monetary policy. Retrieved from http://www.dt.
tesoro.it/Aree-Docum/Relazioni-/Working-Pa/CB-monitoring-ﬁnale.pdf
Jordan (1997). Disinﬂation costs, accelerating inﬂation gains, and CBI. Weltwirtschaftliches
Archiv, 133, 1–21. doi:10.1007/BF02707673
Keefer, P., & Stasavage, D. (1999). Bureaucratic delegation and political institutions: When are
independent central banks irrelevant? Mimeo: WB.
Kutsoati, E. (2002). Debt-contingent, inﬂation contracts and targets. Journal of Economic Dynam-
ics & Control, 26, 399–421. doi:10.1016/S0165-1889(00)00048-8
Kydland, F. E., & Prescott, E. C. (1977). Rules rather than discretion: The inconsistency of opti-
mal plans. Journal of Political Economy, 85, 473–491. doi.10.1086/260580
Loungani, P., & Sheets, N. (1997). Central bank independence, inﬂation, and growth in transition
economies. Journal of Money Credit and Banking, 29, 381–399.
Lucas, E. R., & Sargent, T. J. (1981). Rational expectations and econometric practice. Min-
neapolis: The University of Minnesota Press.
Lybek, T. (1999). Central bank autonomy and inﬂation and output performance in the Baltic
states, Russia and other countries of the former Soviet Union, 1995–1997 (IMF Working
Paper No. 99/4). Washington DC: IMF.
Maliszewski, W. S. (2000). CBI in transition economies. Economies of Transition, 8, 749–789.
doi:10.1111/1468-0351.00063
Mangano, G. (1998). Measuring CBI: A tale of subjectivity and of its consequences. Oxford Eco-
nomic Papers, 50, 468–492. doi:10.1093/oxfordjournals.oep.a028657
Moser, P. (1999). Checks and balances, and the supply of central bank independence. European
Economic Review, 43, 1569–1593. doi:10.1016/S0014-2921(98)00045-2
Neumann, M. J. M. (1991). Precommitment by CBI. Open Economies Review, 2, 95–112.
doi:10.1007/BF01886895
Posen, A. S. (1998). CBI and disinﬂationary credibility: A missing link? Oxford Economic
Papers, 50, 335–359. doi:10.1093/oxfordjournals.oep.a028650
Radzyner, O., & Riesinger, S. (1997). CBI in transition: Legislation and reality in Central and
Eastern Europe. Focus on Transition, 2, 55–90.
Rogoff, K. (1985). The optimal degree of commitment to a monetary target. Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 10, 1160–1190. doi:10.2307/1885679
Tinbergen, J. (1954). Centralization and decentralization in economic policy. Amsterdam: North-
Holland Publishing Co.
Walsh, C. E., (1999). When should central bankers be ﬁred? Economics of Governance, 3, 1–21.




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Economic Research-Ekonomska Istraživanja 185
Ta
bl
e
A
3.
P
re
di
ct
ed
&
re
si
du
al
va
lu
es
in
en
tir
e
pe
ri
od
of
tr
an
si
tio
n
(1
99
4–
20
12
).
T
G
M
T
π/ 1+
π
P
re
di
ct
ed
-
va
lu
e
R
es
id
ua
l
S
ta
nd
ar
d
-
pr
ed
.
v.
S
ta
nd
ar
d
-
re
si
du
al
S
td
.e
rr
.
-
pr
ed
.v
al
M
ah
al
an
ob
is
-
di
st
.
D
el
et
ed
-
re
si
du
al
C
oo
k’
s
-
di
st
an
ce
17
0,
11
0
0,
06
0
0,
05
0
−
0,
49
0,
70
0,
01
7
0,
24
3
0,
05
3
0,
01
6
15
0,
08
0
0,
09
0
−
0,
01
0
0,
05
−
0,
14
0,
01
5
0,
00
2
−
0,
01
0
0,
00
0
10
0,
10
0
0,
16
5
−
0,
06
5
1,
41
−
0,
91
0,
02
7
1,
97
7
−
0,
07
6
0,
07
8
9
0,
12
0
0,
18
0
−
0,
06
0
1,
68
−
0,
84
0,
03
0
2,
81
3
−
0,
07
4
0,
09
4
12
0,
06
0
0,
13
5
−
0,
07
5
0,
86
−
1,
05
0,
02
0
0,
74
5
−
0,
08
2
0,
05
2
11
0,
08
0
0,
15
0
−
0,
07
0
1,
13
−
0,
98
0,
02
3
1,
28
7
−
0,
07
9
0,
06
4
11
0,
13
0
0,
15
0
−
0,
02
0
1,
13
−
0,
28
0,
02
3
1,
28
7
−
0,
02
3
0,
00
5
13
0,
08
0
0,
12
0
−
0,
04
0
0,
59
−
0,
56
0,
01
8
0,
35
0
−
0,
04
3
0,
01
1
13
0,
32
0
0,
12
0
0,
20
0
0,
59
2,
78
0,
01
8
0,
35
0
0,
21
3
0,
27
3
8
0,
37
0
0,
19
6
0,
17
4
1,
95
2,
43
0,
03
4
3,
79
7
0,
22
6
1,
11
2
15
0,
04
0
0,
09
0
−
0,
05
0
0,
05
−
0,
70
0,
01
5
0,
00
2
−
0,
05
2
0,
01
2
19
0,
04
0
0,
03
0
0,
01
0
−
1,
04
0,
14
0,
02
2
1,
07
3
0,
01
1
0,
00
1
20
0,
05
0
0,
01
5
0,
03
5
−
1,
31
0,
49
0,
02
6
1,
70
9
0,
04
0
0,
02
0
18
0,
03
0
0,
04
5
−
0,
01
5
−
0,
76
−
0,
21
0,
01
9
0,
58
5
−
0,
01
6
0,
00
2
18
0,
03
0
0,
04
5
−
0,
01
5
−
0,
76
−
0,
21
0,
01
9
0,
58
5
−
0,
01
6
0,
00
2
16
0,
02
0
0,
07
5
−
0,
05
5
−
0,
22
−
0,
76
0,
01
6
0,
04
9
−
0,
05
8
0,
01
5
18
0,
04
0
0,
04
5
−
0,
00
5
−
0,
76
−
0,
07
0,
01
9
0,
58
5
−
0,
00
5
0,
00
0
18
0,
05
0
0,
04
5
0,
00
5
−
0,
76
0,
07
0,
01
9
0,
58
5
0,
00
6
0,
00
0
17
0,
03
0
0,
06
0
−
0,
03
0
−
0,
49
−
0,
42
0,
01
7
0,
24
3
−
0,
03
2
0,
00
6
18
0,
04
0
0,
04
5
−
0,
00
5
−
0,
76
−
0,
07
0,
01
9
0,
58
5
−
0,
00
5
0,
00
0
19
0,
07
0
0,
03
0
0,
04
0
−
1,
04
0,
56
0,
02
2
1,
07
3
0,
04
5
0,
01
9
19
0,
03
0
0,
03
0
0,
00
0
−
1,
04
0,
00
0,
02
2
1,
07
3
0,
00
0
0,
00
0
M
ea
n
0,
08
7
0,
08
7
−
0,
00
0
−
0,
00
−
0,
00
0,
02
1
0,
95
5
0,
00
1
0,
08
1
M
ed
ia
n
0,
05
5
0,
06
7
−
0,
01
2
−
0,
36
−
0,
17
0,
01
9
0,
58
5
−
0,
01
3
0,
01
2
186 D. Piplica
